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RESHAPING THE FEDERAL ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE:
JACOBSON v. UNITED STATES
Elena Luisa Garella
Abstract: In Jacobson Y. United States, the Supreme Court narrowed the types of evidence
that the prosecution may rely on to show that a defendant was predisposed to commit a
crime in cases where the defendant raises the entrapment defense. This Note examines the
development of the entrapment doctrine and the doctrine's focus on the jury's role as the
arbiter of the defendant's guilt or innocence. The Note argues that the Supreme Court
strayed from its previous analysis of the defense by broadening the scenarios in which
judges may find entrapment as a matter of law. Judicial activism in the context of entrap-
ment is undesirable because the defense is intended to free persons who the community-
as represented by the jury-determines to be innocent, rather than a tool which judges
may use to control police conduct.
Despite a lack of evidence that Keith Jacobson had been engaging in
the crime of receiving child pornography through the mails, the
United States government targeted him as a suspect and made him the
object of a lengthy undercover investigation.' Prosecuted after
accepting the Postal Service's offer to sell him a pornographic maga-
zine featuring children, Jacobson was convicted by a jury who rejected
his entrapment defense.2 Jacobson appealed on grounds that he had
been entrapped as a matter of law. The Supreme Court agreed and
reversed his conviction, holding that the prosecution cannot prove
predisposition3 to commit a crime with evidence of legal activity alone,
or with evidence gathered during the undercover investigation that
relates to the suspect's private fantasies.4 The Court reasoned that
these types of evidence do not show predisposition to commit illegal
acts beyond a reasonable doubt.5
By finding entrapment as a matter of law, the Jacobson Court
departed from precedent. Previous Supreme Court cases provide that
judges may find entrapment as a matter of law only when the absence
of predisposition is patently clear, or government conduct is so egre-
gious that it completely dominates the will of a person who is, at most,
slightly predisposed to commit the criminal act.6 This Note argues
that the entrapment doctrine was originally designed to allow the fact-
finder to exculpate a defendant who, after an intensive inquiry, it finds
1. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1537-38 (1992) (5-4 decision).
2. Id. at 1540.
3. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the term "predisposition."
4. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1541-43.
5. Id.
6. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
Washington Law Review
to have had no, or virtually no, inclination to commit the act charged,
and committed the act only because of his contact with law enforce-
ment. By finding entrapment as a matter of law in Jacobson's case, the
Court changes the doctrine by setting a precedent of greater judicial
intervention in entrapment cases. Judicial encroachment is undesir-
able because the jury, in the absence of legislation, is the appropriate
body to monitor behavioral standards and police procedures.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
AND JACOBSON v UNITED STA TES
Entrapment, a young criminal defense, emerged in American juris-
prudence when the police began to employ complex deceptive tech-
niques to apprehend violators of vice law.7 Proponents of the
entrapment doctrine have generally divided into two camps. One
favors judicial deterrence of illicit police behavior by refusing to con-
vict its objects.' The other views entrapment as a device which allows
the fact finder to exculpate persons who were lured into crime by the
government or its agents.' The Supreme Court adopted the latter
approach, with its emphasis on the jury's role, and developed unusual
procedural and evidentiary rules to accomodate it."
A. The Origins of the Federal Entrapment Doctrine
The defense of entrapment is a twentieth century innovation in
American jurisprudence."1 When the defense was first asserted, in the
late 1800s, most courts rejected it on grounds that the government's
encouragement of the criminal act was irrelevant to the wrong of its
commission. 2 The notion that government induction of crime under-
mines public policy slowly made headway in state courts in the first
decade of this century. 3 Not until 1915, however, with the case of
Woo Wai v. United States, 4 did the doctrine of entrapment surface in
7. The use of entrapment techniques is limited to vice crimes and nonviolent felonies because
government officials could themselves become liable for encouraging the commission of crimes
with tangible victims. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428-29 (1976) (government
officials' immunity does not extend to violations of criminal law).
8. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
11. GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw § 7.3.2, at 541-42 (1978) (No other
common law legal system has developed an entrapment defense.).
12. See, eg., People v. Mills, 70 N.E. 786, 791 (N.Y. 1904).
13. A brief history of early entrapment cases can be found in N.L.A. Barlow, Entrapment and
the Common Law: Is There a Place for the American Doctrine of Entrapnent?, 41 MOD. L. REV.
266, 268-70 (1978).
14. 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
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a federal opinion. In that case, immigration authorities convinced
defendant Woo Wai to propose, to suspect officials, an illegal plan to
sneak undocumented Chinese into the United States.15 After gather-
ing the desired evidence of corruption, the police charged Woo Wai
with conspiracy.16 The court reversed Woo Wai's conviction in part
because "a sound public policy can be upheld only by denying the
criminality of those who are thus induced to commit acts which
infringe the letter of the criminal statutes."17 Courts relied upon these
words in the following decade and a half as a means of allowing juries
to free the victims of unscrupulous law enforcement methods that
arose with the enactment of sumptuary legislation such as
Prohibition. 8
1. Sorrells v. United States
Few Supreme Court decisions have focused on the entrapment
defense. 9 The first, Sorrells v. United States,20 concerned a man
indicted for possession and sale of whiskey in violation of the National
Prohibition Act after succumbing to the entreaties of an undercover
agent.2 The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded for
15. Id. at 413.
16. Id. at 412.
17. Id. at 415.
18. One reason deceptive police ploys are commonly used in vice enforcement is that such
legislation often is viewed ambivalently by the public. The police, lacking complainants, resort to
infiltrating the criminal underworld. See Richard C. Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants,
Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1093 (1951).
19. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S.
484 (1976); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369
(1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). Russell and Hampton are not discussed in
this Note because the defendants in both cases were concededly predisposed to commit the
narcotics offenses for which they were convicted. Russell asserted that there had been an
"intolerable degree of governmental participation" in the crime, constituting a violation of his
constitutional rights. Russell, 411 U.S. at 424 (quoting Russell v. United States, 459 F.2d 671,
673 (9th Cir. 1972)). The Court held that while some degree of governmental involvement may
be so shocking that it violates due process, it had not been reached in this case. Id. at 432. The
plurality opinion of Hampton suggests, in dicta, that a due process claim may never be available
to a predisposed defendant. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 488-89. Although Russell and Hampton do
not address the predisposition issue, these cases do underline the reluctance of the Court to vary
from the predisposition formula advanced in Sorrells,
20. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
21. The agent used his and defendant Sorrells' common World War I experiences to forge a
bond of friendship which the agent then exploited by begging Sorrells to provide him with
alcohol. At first, Sorrells resisted, declaring that he "did not fool with whiskey." But after
several requests, he succumbed and was arrested. At his trial, the government presented three
witnesses who testified that Sorrells had a reputation as a rumrunner; however, there was no hard
evidence other than the transaction at issue to support this contention. The trial court refused to
allow entrapment instructions. Id. at 438-41.
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proceedings to include an entrapment instruction to the jury.2 2 The
Court held that the jury, if so instructed, may have fzund that Sorrells
had no intention to commit a crime and did so only upon the instiga-
tion of government agents.
The Supreme Court's disposition of Sorrells revealed a sharp dispute
regarding the correct rationale behind the entrapment doctrine. Chief
Justice Hughes, writing for the majority of five, ruled that the entrap-
ment defense is available when government officials provoke otherwise
law-abiding persons to commit crime. Hughes reasoned that Congress
could not have intended that its statutes be wielded against those who
are not morally culpable. 23 He further stated that -when the govern-
ment induces a crime, inquiry must center on the actor's character.24
Evidence that the criminal intent originated in the defendant,
independent of government provocation, will tend to indicate guilt.25
In his concurring opinion, Justice Roberts argued that the doctrine is
less a defense than a method by which courts may protect the purity of
the legal machinery by refusing to sanction treacherous law enforce-
ment practices.26 Roberts would have found entrapment as a matter
of law.27
2. Sherman v. United States
The second Supreme Court decision to focus on entrapment con-
cerned "Dopey" Sherman, convicted of selling narcotics to a stool pig-
eon.28 The defendant met the informant at a doctor's office, where
both were undergoing treatment for drug addiction.,9 The informant
established a friendship with Sherman, based in large part on their
common troubles with morphine.3" He then started to hound Sher-
man to supply him with narcotics, claiming intense suffering." At
22. Id. at 452. Note that Sorrells was decided on December 19, 1932, and Congress passed
the Twenty-sixth Amendment, repealing Prohibition, on February 20, 1933. It was a propitious
moment to argue entrapment for the sale of liquor.
23. Id. at 448. Note that the Court did not state that the entrapment defense has a
constitutional dimension. It is instead grounded in statutory construction and a short common
law history. See, e.g., Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REv. 163, 246-47
(1976).
24. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451 ("[I]f the defendant seeks acquittal by rzason of entrapment he
cannot complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and
predisposition as bearing upon that issue.").
25. Id. at 451-52.
26. Id. at 457 (Roberts, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 459.
28. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
29. Id. at 371.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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first, Sherman refused to help him, but finally did supply the drug and
reverted to addiction alongside his betrayer.32 The jury received
entrapment instructions, but returned a verdict of guilty.3
The Supreme Court, again divided by theory but united in judg-
ment, held that the police had entrapped Sherman as a matter of law
and reversed the conviction.34 The Court's opinion, delivered by Chief
Justice Warren, concentrated on the defendant's lack of predisposi-
tion. 5 Warren noted that Sherman's strong resistance to the inform-
ant's entreaties revealed that the defendant had no propensity to
commit the crime.36 Justice Frankfurter, in concurrence, adopted the
Sorrells minority analysis and argued that the conviction should be
overturned simply because the courts cannot countenance unscrupu-
lous police methods.3 7
B. Entrapment Doctrine in Theory and Practice
Commentators have labeled the divergent reasoning of the Sorrells
majority and concurring minority respectively "subjective" and
"objective." 38 While this dispute no longer divides the Court,3 9 under-
standing the difference in approach is essential to grasping the nature
of the entrapment doctrine. The "subjective" camp places the deter-
mination of the defendant's guilt or innocence in the jury's hands. The
"objective" theorists, however, leave it to the judge to decide whether
the law enforcement methods employed were so egregious that the
defendant must be released as a matter of public policy.
1. Subjective and Objective Approaches
The Sorrells majority's subjective approach examines the origins of
the criminal intent.4' The function of the trier of fact is critical as it
must decide whether the defendant possessed the intent to commit the
crime irrespective of government activity. The Sorrells and Sherman
32. Id. at 373.
33. Id. at 372.
34. Id. at 369, 378.
35. Id. at 372, 376.
36. Id. at 373.
37. Id. at 384.
38. See, eg., Louis M. Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal Justice
Dilemma, 5 Sup. Cr. REv. 111 (1981).
39. See Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 66 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring).
40. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 445 (1932) ("When the criminal design originates,
not with the accused, but is conceived in the mind of the government officers, and the accused is
by persuasion, deceitful representation, or inducement lured into the commission of a criminal
act, the government is estopped by sound public policy from prosecution therefor.") (quoting
Newman v. United States, 299 F. 128, 131 (4th Cir. 1924)).
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Courts used the term of art 'predisposition' to refer to the mens rea of
the defendant in the context of entrapment cases.
Predisposition does not refer to the intent to commit the precise
crime for which the defendant asserting entrapment has been indicted,
but rather the intention to commit a similar act.4 1 The state of mind,
as opposed to any overt actions, of the defendant is at issue.42 The
trier of fact scrutinizes the defendant's activities in order to determine
whether the police captured a hapless criminal or corrupted a helpless
innocent.4 3 If the trier of fact finds that the defendant was already
engaged in a criminal course of conduct, even an extremely tempting
inducement or high degree of police involvement does not create the
crime.' Thus, the subjective entrapment doctrine affords no protec-
tion to a person predisposed to criminal activity.
In contrast, the objective theory focuses on the probable effect that
the police inducement would have on a hypothetical noncriminal per-
son.4 5 If the defendant succumbs to an inducement so tempting that it
would corrupt a person who would not normally engage in the crimi-
nal activity, he is entitled to the defense, regardless of any pre-existing
mens rea.46 The court sets the accused free as a matter of public pol-
icy if government agents employed improper inducement, even where
the prosecution advances irrefutable evidence of a previous course of
41. Donnelly, supra note 18, at 1091, 1107-08.
42. United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 1986).
43. See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958) ("[A] line must be drawn
between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal."); Sorrells, 287
U.S. at 451 (The accused must face an "appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct
and predisposition .... ").
44. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 434 (1973) ("Nor does it seem particularly
desirable for the law to grant complete immunity from prosecution to .3ne who himself planned
to commit a crime, and then committed it, simply because government undercover agents
subjected him to inducements which might have seduced a hypothetical individual who was not
so predisposed.").
45. Note that the hypothetical person is not the reasonable man of tort law, or even a simply
average person. If the hypothetical person were so defined, Sherman would not have escaped
conviction under the test, for it cannot be asserted that the average person would be induced to
sell narcotics upon the blandishments of an addict. Sorrells, however, may represent a fact
pattern which would ensnare many average folks. A more extensive discussion of the
hypothetical person posited by the objective entrapment theory may be found in Park, supra note
23, at 171-75.
46. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (The objective approach "shifts
attention... to the conduct of the police and the likelihood, objectively considered, that it would
entrap only those ready and willing to commit crime.").
Vol. 68:185, 1993
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criminal activity.47 The decision is vested in the judiciary, which can
create standards for police action.48
2. Jury's Role Under Entrapment Doctrine
Under the subjective approach adopted by the Supreme Court, the
trier of fact, rather than the judge, plays the pivotal role in determin-
ing the defendant's legal fate.4 9 Where the judge finds evidence suffi-
cient to constitute a triable issue of entrapment,5 ° the jury must decide
whether or not there is a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
ready and willing to commit the offense charged.51  The inquiry
focuses on the moral status of the accused, rather than the nature of
the police conduct. 2
The prosecution enjoys unusually broad latitude in the types of evi-
dence it may present to the jury in order to expose the state of mind of
the defendant. For example, the usual rule of evidence prohibiting the
prosecution from introducing evidence of bad character until the
accused forwards evidence of his good character does not apply when
predisposition is at issue. Courts also freely admit hearsay and prior
crimes.5 3 Some commentators have roundly criticized these practices,
especially the admission of otherwise impermissible hearsay. 4 How-
ever, they fill in the evidentiary gap that is left by the jury's incapacity
to focus soley on the charged act itself when measuring predisposition.
47. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 456-57 (Roberts, J., concurring).
48. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 385 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943) (representing the efflorescence of the notion that the judiciary should
monitor police behavior, with its mandate that "[j]udicial supervision of the administration of
criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized
standards of procedure and evidence"); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341-42 (1939).
49. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 377 ("[T]he issue of whether a defendant has been entrapped is for
the jury as part of its function of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.").
50. The judge may find that entrapment is a genuine issue where the defendant asserts
governmental inducement and can point to evidence "from which a reasonable juror could derive
a reasonable doubt as to the origin of criminal intent." United States v. Nations, 764 F.2d 1073,
1080 (5th Cir. 1985). The inducement must be of a nature that might tempt a law-abiding citizen
to commit a crime and the evidence must be more than "flimsy or insubstantial." Id.; see also
United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 1986). Once the defendant meets this
burden, the government must prove that the defendant was predisposed, i.e. possessed the
requisite criminal intent. United States v. Johnson, 590 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.), reh'g en banc, 605
F.2d 1025 (1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1033 (1980).
51. EDNVARD DEvIrr ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 13.09 (Supp.
1991).
52. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
53. Park, supra note 23, at 247-61.
54. Id. at 247-55.
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C. Jacobson v. United States
Government agents arrested Keith Jacobson for knowingly receiv-
ing child pornography transported in interstate ccmmerce following
an extended period of investigation by government agencies. 5  Jacob-
son first came to the attention of postal authorities when they discov-
ered his name on a customer mailing list of aL California adult
bookstore.56 The bookstore's records indicated that Jacobson had
ordered two magazines, delivered in February 1984, entitled Bare Boys
I and Bare Boys IL 57 The magazines featured photographs of naked
preadolescent and teenage boys and written text promoting nudism 8
The receipt of this literature was legal.5 9
In January 1985, a postal inspector mailed Jacobson a letter from
the "American Hedonist Society."6 Postal authorities created this
fictional organization which purported to advocate the "right to seek
pleasure without restrictions being placed on us by outdated puritan
morality."61 Jacobson enrolled in the society by sending a fee and
membership application with his responses to a sexual attitude survey
provided him by the fictitious society.62 He indicated that he
"enjoy[ed]" sexual materials relating to pre-teen sex but nonetheless
55. Jacobson was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (1986), which provides, in
part, for the punishment of any person who "knowingly receives, or distributes any visual
depiction that has been transported... in interstate or foreign commerce... if (A) the producing
of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (1986) defines that "[flor the
purposes of this chapter, the term-(l) 'minor' means any person under the age of eighteen years;
[and the term] (2) 'sexually explicit conduct' means actual or simulated-(A) sexual intercourse,
including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the
same or opposite sex; (B) bestiality; (C) masturbation; (D) sadistic ,r masochistic; abuse; or
(E) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person ......
56. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1538 (1992).
57. Id.
58. The characterization of these magazines has been a matter of no little controversy.
Defense counsel describes them as "depicting boys in their teens and early twenties in outdoor
settings... not child pornography." Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5-6, Jacobson (No. 90-
1124). The prosecution, however, points out that they "consisted almost entirely of photographs
of nude pre-teen and teenage boys in poses that focused on their genitalia . . . . The only
advertisement in the magazines was one for two other series of magazines published by the same
outfit: a five-issue series entitled Nudist Angels... [which] feature[d] young girls, and a two-issue
series entitled Nudist Children." Brief for the United States at 3, Jacobson (No. 90-1124).
59. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1538.
60. Id.
61. Id. At the same time he revealed his interest in teenage sex, he also requested
confidentiality from the organization. Id.
62. Id.
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opposed pedophilia.63 In exchange, the society was to send Jacobson
quarterly newsletters. 64
This approach was only the first of approximately ten that the gov-
ernment made over the course of twenty-six months.65 Jacobson
received materials from five different fictitious organizations, compa-
nies, and personalities, at least four of which promoted the legalization
of child pornography. 66 Jacobson responded positively to several of
the mailings. After the second contact, from "Midlands Data
Research," which encouraged inquiries from persons who "believe in
the joys of sex and the complete awareness of those lusty and youthful
lads and lasses of the neophite [sic] age," Jacobson wrote back request-
ing more information and stating his interest in teenage sexuality. 67
At later times during the lengthy correspondence between the govern-
ment and Jacobson, Jacobson offered that he had an above average
interest in "preteen sex-homosexual [sic]," enjoyed "male-male" por-
nography, and "like[d] good looking young guys (in their late teens
and early 20s [sic]) doing their thing together. ' 68 On a few occasions,
however, Jacobson failed to respond to the government's
solicitations. 69
In March 1987, the Customs Service, after receiving Jacobson's
name from the Postal Service, sent him an advertisement for photo-
graphs of young boys having sex. 70 This was Jacobson's eighth mail-
ing from the government, but the first to tender illegal materials. 7 '
Jacobson placed an order which was never filled.72 Shortly thereafter,
the Postal Service sent him a letter from another sham organization
called the "Far Eastern Trading Company, Ltd." which decried inter-
national censorship and boasted that it had developed a method to
import pornography into the United States without Customs Service
interference.73 Jacobson wrote back for a catalogue and ordered Boys
Who Love Boys, a publication advertised as containing photographs of
"eleven-year-old and fourteen-year-old boys get[ting] it on in every
63. Id.
64. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7 Jacobson (No. 90-1124).
65. Because it is unclear from the record whether the "American Hedonist Society"
newsletters were actually sent, and what their content was, the count of approximately ten
contacts does not include the newsletters.
66. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1538-40.
67. Id. at 1538.
68. Id. at 1538-39.
69. Id. at 1538-40.
70. Id. at 1539.
71. Id. at 1544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 1539.
73. Id.
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way possible. Oral, anal sex and heavy masturbation."74 He was
arrested upon a controlled delivery of this item.75 A search incident to
the arrest uncovered only the Bare Boys magazines and the mailings
that the government had sent Jacobson.76
At trial, Jacobson asserted the defense of entrapment, arguing that
the government had induced him to order the child pornography.77
The prosecution rebutted the claim by offering Jacobson's original
purchase of Bare Boys I and Bare Boys 11 and his responses to the
Postal Service's sham organizations as evidence that he was predis-
posed to commit the crime.78 Jacobson, however, testified that he
ordered Boys Who Love Boys only because he was curious to see what
"all the trouble and the hysteria over pornography" was about, a curi-
osity he declared was stoked by the government's persistent stream of
hedonist propaganda.79 The jury found Jacobson guilty and the trial
court sentenced Jacobson to two years probation and 250 hours of
community service.80 A court of appeals panel reversed the verdict,8"
but a divided Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en bane,
affirmed the conviction. 2
Jacobson's petition for a writ of certiorari presented the Supreme
Court with several questions relating to both the procedural and sub-
stantive aspects of the entrapment defense.8 3 These questions included
whether the government can rely on responses to deceptive surveys
obtained in the course of an undercover investigation to prove predis-
position, and whether entrapment has occurred as a matter of law
where the government violated its own guidelines in the process of
subjecting the suspect to several lengthy stings.8 4
The Court held that the prosecution must prove that the defendant
was predisposed to break the law before the government officials estab-
74. Id. at 1544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 1540.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1541.
79. Id. at 1540.
80. United States v. Jacobson, 893 F.2d 999, 1000 (8th Cir.), vacated, 899 F.2d 1549, reh'g en
banc, 916 F.2d 467 (1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
81. Id. at 999.
82. United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
83. Petitioner submitted two constitutional questions: the first asking whether the law
requires some level of suspicion before subjecting a suspect to an extended undercover operation,
the second whether the government's conduct in this case was so outrageous that it violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court's decision did not reach either
of these questions. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i Jacobson (No. 90-1124).
84. Id.
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lished contact.85 Therefore, evidence based on interactions between
law enforcement officials and suspects during the course of an under-
cover investigation cannot, by itself, prove predisposition beyond a
reasonable doubt where it only reveals "personal inclinations" to
engage in illegal acts. 6 Instead, police must gather evidence of pre-
disposition to commit precisely the crime charged that predates the
investigation.8 7 Furthermore, the nature of the evidence in this case-
the purchase of legal magazines before the investigation, and the
defendant's admissions of an interest in viewing sexually explicit pho-
tographs of young boys-failed to show the requisite specific intent to
commit the illegal act of receiving child pornography through the
mails. 8 Finally, the Court considered the government's use of free
speech themes in its efforts to ensnare Jacobson, a tactic which inap-
propriately pressured him to order illicit materials as a censorship-
fighting gesture.8 9 No rational jury, it concluded, could have found
petitioner predisposed beyond a reasonable doubt.9" The Court there-
fore reversed the judgment.9 1
II. IMPLICATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS OF THE
JACOBSON DECISION
The Supreme Court's holding that the prosecution must prove pre-
disposition to commit the exact type of offense charged creates an
unreasonable burden. Absent this novel requirement, the jury in
Jacobson had a rational basis for finding the defendant predisposed to
receive child pornography through the mails. By rejecting the jury
verdict, the Court encourages judicial activism in the context of
entrapment that is both inconsistent with its previous decisions and
undesirable.
A. The Prosecution Should Not Be Required to Prove Specific
Predisposition to Commit the Type of Crime Charged
By holding, as a matter of law, that the evidence failed to support an
inference that Jacobson was predisposed beyond a reasonable doubt to
commit the crime of receiving child pornography through the mails,
the Court saddles the prosecution with an inappropriately high burden
of proof. By distinguishing the "predisposition to view photographs of
85. United States v. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1540 (1992).
86. Id. at 1542.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1543.
91. Id.
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preteen sex" from the predisposition to "commit the crime of receiving
child pornography through the mails," the Court prevents the prose-
cution from presenting the jury with relevent evidence of
predisposition.92
The Court's reasoning subverts the established entrapment doctrine
because the normal rules of evidence are suspended when predisposi-
tion is at issue.93 The jury is entitled to examine conduct and previous
charges that do not share all of the elements of the crime at bar in its
effort to determine whether the accused was "ready and willing.""
The Court's ruling renders this latitude irrelevant by sharply reducing
the types of evidence the prosecution can advance. 95 Now the guilty
may more easily shield themselves with this defense, originally
intended to acquit "person[s] otherwise innocent" whom the govern-
ment lures into crime.96
B. A Rational Jury Could Find Jacobson Predisposed Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt Based on the Evidence Presented
The prosecution adduced sufficient evidence to prove that Jacobson
was predisposed, beyond a reasonable doubt, to commit the crime of
receiving child pornography. 97 While the Court held that neither type
of evidence98 presented could, in itself, prove predisposition, the Court
failed to consider the cumulative weight of the evidence. A further
factor upon which the jury could have relied was Jacobson's easy
capitulation to a very low level of governmental pressure.
1. Both Types of Evidence Dismissed by the Court as Individually
Insufficient Should Have Been Considered in Combination
The fact that Jacobson ordered two publications arguably designed
to appeal to the prurient interests of pedophiles, and that he described
92. Id.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
94. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 375 (1958).
95. Cf. United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1009 (1933) ("One who distributes obscene
pamphlets locally is not morally averse to sending them to another state .... The [entrapment]
doctrine derives from a spontaneous moral revulsion against using the powers of government to
beguile innocent... persons into lapses which they might otherwise resist. Such an emotion is
out of place, if they are already embarked in conduct morally indistinguishable, and of the same
kind.").
96. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
97. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1543-44 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
98. The prosecution presented two categories of evidence: Jacobson's activities prior to the
investigation (ordering the Bare Boys magazines), and his activities during the investigation
(suspect responses to the surveys and act of ordering the pornography). See supra notes 60-80
and accompanying text.
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himself as interested in sex with children should have been considered
together when weighing the prosecution's proof of predisposition.
Referring to Jacobson's mail order of Bare Boys I and Bare Boys II,
the Court stated that "[e]vidence of predisposition to do what once
was lawful is not, by itself sufficient to show predisposition to do what
is now illegal."9 9 Similarly, the Court held that Jacobson's suspect
replies to the Postal Inspector's surveys by themselves did not carry
the government's burden." °
By failing to combine the two types of evidence, the Jacobson major-
ity did not consider the total impact of the prosecution's evidence on a
jury. Jacobson's purchase of magazines featuring only naked boys
supports a fair inference of his interest in viewing sexually oriented
photographs of children before the investigation began. 01 Permitting
the magazines to be used against Jacobson is consistent with the Sor-
rells admonishment that a defendant asserting entrapment "cannot
complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his own con-
duct and predisposition."102 Such an inquiry may include an examina-
tion of noncriminal activity where relevant. 103
Jacobson's responses to questionnaires which the government sent
him further backs an inference that Jacobson was predisposed. Jacob-
son described himself as "enjoy[ing]" pre-teen sex pornographic
materials to the investigation's first inquiry, "interested in teenage sex-
uality" to the second, and as having an above average interest in
"preteen sex-homosexual" to the third." 4 These statements buttress
the conclusion that prior to the government's investigation, Jacobson
had a penchant for viewing the type of illicit materials he was con-
victed of receiving. Thus, the Court should not have discounted this
99. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1542 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 1542-43.
101. Although the defense presented unrebutted testimony by Jacobson that he did not derive
sexual pleasure from the magazines, the jury was not obligated to believe it. See Masciale v.
United States, 356 U.S. 386, 388 (1958) (jury entitled to disbelieve unrebutted testimony by
defendant in entrapment case).
102. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
103. United States v. Nelson, 847 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1988) (possession of legal paperback
books describing sexual acts with children used to prove predisposition to receive child
pornography through the mails); United States v. Tyson, 470 F.2d 381, 383 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 985 (1973) (testimony about a 'roach clip' seen in defendant's apartment
allowed in narcotics prosecution); see also Ben Hardy, The Traps of Entrapment, 3 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 165, 184-85 (1974) (prosecution can present evidence of behavior that is itself legal if related
to the elements of the crime in question).
104. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1538-39.
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relevant information merely because it was gathered in the course of
the investigation.105
2. The Pressure Exerted by the Government to Buy Child
Pornography Was So Faint that Jacobson's Capitulation
Supports an Inference of Predisposition
The investigatory procedures were neither intrusive nor compelling.
Therefore, the Court should have permited consideration of Jacob-
son's two orders of child pornography from the government's cata-
logues as evidence of his predisposition at the outset of the
investigation. The opinion states that the literature the government
sent to Jacobson may have piqued Jacobson's interest in the contra-
band and did "exert... substantial pressure" on him to obtain it by
questioning the constitutionality of legislation banning child pornogra-
phy.'0 6 As the opinion acknowledged, however, this effect amounted
only to an "arguable inference."'0 7 The Court should not have used
this inference as a basis for nullifying the jury's verdict because a
rational jury could legitimately interpret the facts differently.' 8
A jury could have reasoned that the government's method of inter-
acting with Jacobson during the investigation was non-intrusive. The
authorities never dealt with Jacobson in person but instead through
the mails. Nor did the government make direct offers to sell illicit
materials. Jacobson solicited the offers by remitting, variously, a
membership fee, surveys indicating an interest in child pornography,
and requests for further information and brochures advertising child
pornography.' 0 9 Including the responses to Jacobson's expressions of
interest, the government contacted Jacobson fewer than one dozen
times over the course of twenty six months.11 ° Jacobson had the
option of simply ignoring the sporadic mailings, rather than encourag-
ing continued contact.
The jury could also have construed the free speech content of the
government's mailings as not applying inappropriate pressure on the
defendant. Although the fictitious organizations did decry the
105. Park, supra note 23, at 200 ("Predisposition may also be shown by testimony about the
target's actions during negotiations leading to the offense charged."); see also Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd,
692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961 (1983) (ready compliance with an illegal
offer alone can be considered proof of predisposition).
106. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1542.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1546 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
109. See supra notes 62-74 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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criminalization of some forms of pornography, that very message sig-
naled the illegality of the material. That Jacobson was aware he was
committing an illegal act was not disputed.111 As the opinion states,
"there is a common understanding that most people obey the law even
when they disapprove of it." '112 If we analogize this fact pattern to a
bribery sting, it is fantastic to suggest that a defendant could support
an entrapment claim by avowing that the undercover agent avouched,
"Bribery is illegal-but it really shouldn't be."
The tactics employed in this case are easily distinguishable from
those described in the only other Supreme Court decision finding
entrapment as a matter of law. In Sherman, the informant befriended
the accused, repeatedly requested the narcotics in person, and whined
about physical suffering in order to overcome the defendant's initial
resistance.11 3 Sherman was recovering from drug addiction, which is
at least partially a physical condition. The Court no doubt considered
this factor when it condemned law enforcement for its "play... on the
weaknesses of an innocent party."'1 4 Jacobson has no similar disabil-
ity. He may be weak, but his weakness is in his character alone. A
successful entrapment defense will free a person of deficient character
whom the jury nonetheless finds innocent; it does not follow that a
defendant should be able to rely upon the deficiency itself to show
innocence. 15
C. By Overturning Jacobson's Conviction, the Supreme Court
Reshapes the Role of the Jury in Entrapment Decisions in a
Manner Inconsistent with Entrapment Doctrine
By overturning Jacobson's conviction, the Court narrows the scope
of the jury's powers in entrapment cases. This outcome runs afoul of
the weight of authority, which ascribes tremendous importance to the
jury's role. It also undermines the strong policies advanced by com-
111. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4-14, Jacobson (No. 90-1124).
112. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1542.
113. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
114. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376 (1958).
115. See FLETCHER, supra note 11, § 6.8, at 509-14. Criminal accountability is found when
the actor could have been fairly expected to avoid the action. This subjective inquiry does not
encompass mere personal weakness unless it rises to the level of an excuse such as duress,
necessity, and insanity. Greed for example, is fair game for the government. See also United
States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 620 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1007 (1983) (unrealistically
high bribe consisting of a loan totaling $100 million dollars for a mining venture company, from
which defendant anticipated netting $15 million in profits, did not constitute entrapment where
defendant was predisposed).
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munity involvement, as represented by the jury, in the highly discre-
tionary matter of acquitting due to entrapment.
1. The Court Failed to Abide by Stare Decisis
The Jacobson Court ruled that a rational jury could not have found
Jacobson entrapped despite the fact that a rational jury could have so
found. With this holding, the Court departs from the letter and spirit
of its own precedents. Sorrells rejects the view that the entrapment
defense frees the guilty whenever the court is sufficiently shocked by
police behavior.116 "Clemency is the function of the Executive," not
the judiciary.117 Therefore, the defendant's guilt or innocence must
be determined. In a jury trial this is the job of the jury.11
In United States v. Russell," 9 the Court was reluctant to find
entrapment as a matter of law for another reason: government involve-
ment in procuring crime violates no independent right of the object of
the trap. 120 The judge has no equitable duty to order acquittal unless
the accused is untainted by any sign of predispositio:a. Indeed, appel-
late courts have respected the virtual sanctity of the jury verdict by
following the rule that one can successfully assert entrapment as a
matter of law only where the absence of predisposition is "patently
clear." 12' This rule is consistent with the standard of review establish-
ing that the judgment must stand if any reasonable juror considering
the evidence in the light most favorable to the government could con-
clude that the defendant was predisposed. 22 In Jacobson, the Court
disregards its previous decisions and expands the dis-cretionary powers
of the judiciary in adjudicating entrapment cases.
2. Entrapment Decisions Are Most Appropriately Rendered by Juries
Entrapment verdicts are best left in the hands of the jury because
the jurors' function is not only to ensure a fair trial but also to estab-
lish community standards and legitimize legal proceedings by involv-
116. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 449 (1932).
117. Id.
118. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 377 ("[U]nless it can be decided as a matter of law, the issue of
whether a defendant has been entrapped is for the jury as part of its function of determining the
guilt or innocence of the accused.").
119. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
120. Id. at 430.
121. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 373; see, e.g., United States v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir.
1986); United States v. Henciar, 568 F.2d 489, 491 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Albert
v. United States, 435 U.S. 953 (1978).
122. Glasser v. United States, 215 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); United States v. Duvall, 846 F.2d 966,
974 (5th Cir. 1988).
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ing the citizenry. 123 Entrapment is a portmanteau doctrine that allows
the finder of fact to weigh both the accused's culpability and the offi-
cials' duplicity.
Drawing the line between predisposition and lack of predisposition
involves exercising values that, paradoxically, are both fundamental to
our notions of criminality and unknowable. Entrapment doctrine
presumes that it is reasonable to judge people less blameworthy if they
have fallen under the influence of undercover agents. But blamewor-
thiness in the abstract is a highly elastic concept that varies from time
to time and place to place. Absent legislative mandate, the jury is the
most appropriate body to apply standards of justice that reflect com-
munity expectations.
124
Jury decisions are based on many variables, including the nature of
the crime involved. Typically, the public is less concerned about
enforcing 'victimless' vice crimes than it is with other crimes, due to
the natural desire to punish in proportion to damage done. 125 Stan-
dards of behavior are much stricter where transgressions may result in
actual harm.2 6 Juries will inevitably apply these values to the con-
duct of defendants claiming entrapment. By finding Jacobson
entrapped as a matter of law, the Supreme Court suggests that human
morality is so ductile that a low level of pressure can entice a law-
abiding citizen into purchasing child pornography. A reasonable jury
may not share this view.127
The jury assessing an entrapment claim will also consider the nature
of the contrivances that law enforcement officials employ. Commu-
nity standards of acceptable police conduct naturally vary. 128 Where
the rights of individuals are not at stake, allowing the community a
large measure of influence in this area is desirable. The Jacobson
Court found the tactics used by the postal authorities unacceptable. 2 9
123. See, eg., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV.
443, 459-60 (1889).
124. For the disadvantages of having judges make the decisions in this area, see infra part
II.D.
125. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983).
126. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 258-85 (Midway
Reprint, Univ. of Chicago Press 1970) (1966).
127. The defense is of course free to present testimony that the defendant's moral agency was
severely burdened by the government's actions. See United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 236
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 666 (1975) ("[The criminal law should be opened up to new
behavioral information to better approximate, in limited situations, the ideal that the law
punishes only the free choice to do wrong.").
128. See generally Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L.
REV. 168, 181-201 (1972).
129. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1540-42 (1992).
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A jury could well have decided otherwise by reasoning that persons
not predisposed to the crime would not have succumbed, 13' and that
the utility of apprehending persons who receive child pornography
through the mails warranted the deception.13 1
D. Judge-created Law in Entrapment Cases is Undesirable
The Jacobson decision fails to give law enforcement officials clear
guidance in distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable police prac-
tices. The decision represents the danger of judge-created law in areas
void of constitutional mandate. The slow supplantation of juror dis-
cretion in entrapment cases may cause Congress to at last address the
entrapment issue by enacting a federal entrapment statute.
1. The Jacobson Decision Fails to Provide Clear Guidance to Police
Agencies
The holding in Jacobson that the defendant's predisposition cannot
be proven with evidence previously considered acceptable in entrap-
ment doctrine will be a source of considerable confusion for law
enforcement officials. 132 The Court does not hold, as the dissent
asserts, that the government must obtain enough evidence of the sus-
pect's predisposition before it initiates contact with him.133 Instead,
the prosecution can adduce the evidence of predisposition any time
before trial. A dilemma is thus created for law enforcement, which
will be compelled to decide whether or not to undertake costly under-
cover operations when adequate proof of predisposition is lacking at
the outset of the investigation.
The practical effect of Jacobson will be to strongly discourage
lengthy sting operations unless evidence of predisposition is available
before the onset of undercover activities. By limiting the use of evi-
dence gathered as a result of the suspect's interactions with under-
cover agents during the course of investigation, Jacobson will make
such investigations costlier for the police because the rule will bar
them from prosecuting a greater percentage of the people they
ensnare. In a borderline case such as Jacobson's, this may not seem to
be an entirely undesirable result. This style of investigation, however,
130. See supra, notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
131. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 126, at 318-23 (jury will judge when police methods
have been unnacceptable, and it is likely to refuse to convict in those circumstances).
132. See supra notes 54-55, 87-88, 93-96 and accompanying text.
133. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1545 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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has managed to capture major offenders.134  Therefore, whether the
benefit of deterring the police from employing these methods would
outweigh the detriment of permitting criminals to go undetected is
unclear.
Law enforcement officials may choose to accept the greater risk that
an expensive and drawn out investigation will produce a nonconvict-
able suspect, particularly where the crime involved is nefarious. 135
Since a defendant in Jacobson's shoes is arguably guilty,'36 the Jacob-
son opinion in such a scenario would have the effect of freeing the
culpable after a large expenditure of public monies. An unnecessary
gulf could emerge between what appears to be the Court's condemna-
tion of these techniques and actual police practice. This type of con-
flict makes the legal system appear inconsistent and unfair.
By castigating the Postal Inspector's use of free speech propaganda,
the Court inappropriately focuses on the inducement half of the
entrapment formula. While it is necessary to measure predisposition
by referring to the method of inducement, the Court's strong language
may suggest to law enforcement and the judiciary (and most certainly
defense counsel) that communications with suspected criminals during
undercover investigations must adhere strictly to the business of vio-
lating the law. Such restrictions cramp law enforcement techniques
unnecessarily.
The Court's angry reaction to the Jacobson investigation probably
stems from reaction to the apparently huge amount of effort and
money expended to apprehend a person that a rational jury could have
acquitted. By reversing Jacobson's conviction, the Court tacitly
expressed its disapproval over the perceived misallocation of police
resources. Because the Court was unwilling to expressly depart from
previous binding decisions, it mutated the predisposition test, nar-
rowed the type of evidence available to the prosecution, and censured
the type of inducement implemented to achieve the desired result. 37
134. E.g., United States v. Thoma, 726 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 467 U.S. 1228
(1984). In Thoma, the defendant was targeted for an investigation of prohibited mailings of child
pornography without any evidence that he was in fact engaging in that activity. A search of his
house turned up video equipment and photographs of children engaged in sexual activity. Id. at
1195; see H.R. REP. No. 536, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
492, 503, 507 (highly deceptive methods are required to investigate violations of laws limiting the
distribution of child pornography).
135. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1989), illegalizing the receipt of child pornography, was
enacted in part because the production and consumption of child pornography is correlated to
child molestation. H.R. REP. No. 536, supra note 134, at 10, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
493.
136. See supra part II.B.
137. See supra parts II.A, II.B.
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Unfortunately, courts will inevitably apply the holdings derived from
this particular set of facts to very different cases, 138 with the possible
effect of acquitting defendants who ought to be convicted. The Court,
unwilling to lay down a clear rule or adhere to the spirit of the earlier
decisions, has confused the issues and failed to provide lower courts
with the solid theoretical and practical foundation required to provide
guidance.
2. The Jacobson Decision Will Erode the Flexible Nature of the
Entrapment Defense
By deviating from the original formulation of entrapment, the
Jacobson opinion undermines the inherent flexibility of the defense.
The focus on predisposition was designed to prevent judges from lay-
ing down police policy. 139 The entrapment defense was "not intended
to give the federal judiciary a 'chancellor's foot' veto" over law
enforcement practices of which it does not approve. 1 ' As lower court
and appellate court judges subsume the decision into their understand-
ing of entrapment law, they will use it to acquit persons caught by
methods of which they reprove. 41 Each decision will create fertile
precedent for further judicial activism, forcing the slow erosion of the
subjective nature of the defense. Jacobson introduces objective entrap-
ment theory through the back door. 142
In Sorrells, the Court entrusted the jury with the duty to judge those
cases in which the police have not coerced the defendant into commit-
ting crime and the defendant was not already engaged in illegal con-
duct at the time of the initial government contact.1 43 This broad
middle ground will contract as the judiciary's decisional authority
increases. An advantage of jury verdicts is that the reasoning jurors
use cannot be the basis of subsequent decisions.'" The incursion of
judges, whose decisions do create binding precedent, into the jury's
territory, may have unforeseen and unfortunate consequences. If dis-
satisfied by the entrapment doctrine as sculpted by judges, Congress
138. James Hardisty, Reflections on Stare Decisis, 55 IND. L.J. 41, 53-56 (1979).
139. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973).
140. Id.
141. Of course, a strong showing of predisposition will still prevent unjustified dismissals of
very serious crimes.
142. See supra, part I.B.I (description of subjective and objective docrtrines).
143. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); see also Note, Entrapment, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1333, 1337-38 (1960).
144. LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 352 (1930).
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may respond at last to the suggestion that it settle the issue by enacting
a federal entrapment statute. 145
III. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court did not correctly decide the issues presented in
Jacobson v. United States. The Court erroneously held that a rational
jury could not have found Jacobson predisposed beyond a reasonable
doubt. By considering both types of evidence the prosecution offered
independently, the Court failed to measure the cumulative impact of
the evidence on the jury. The pressure the police applied on Jacobson
to buy child pornography was so mild and infrequent that a jury could
make a valid inference of predisposition. Furthermore, in holding that
legal actions undertaken before the investigation and evidence of
desire to engage in illegal activity gathered during investigation cannot
prove the prerequisite intent to break the law, the Court inappropri-
ately advanced a specific predisposition test that increases the prosecu-
tion's burden of proof.
By overturning Jacobson's conviction, the Court abridges the role of
the jury in entrapment doctrine. Not only does the Court violate the
spirit and the policies of previous entrapment decisions, it opens the
door to judge-made law in this area. This development is undesirable
because juries, as representatives of the community, are best equipped
to hand down decisions about acceptable citizen and police behavior
where constitutional rights are not at stake.
145. Maura P. J. Whelan, Lead Us Not into (Unwarranted) Temptation: A Proposal to Replace
the Entrapment Defense with a Reasonable-Suspicion Requirement, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1193
(1985) (arguing that legislation addressing police practices would be preferable to the entrapment
defense).
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